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Soviet Support for International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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SOVIET SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
AND REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

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The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Treasury, and Energy.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
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KEY JUDGMENTS

- The Soviets are deeply engaged in support of revolutionary violence worldwide. Such involvement is a basic tenet of Soviet policy, pursued in the interests of weakening unfriendly societies, destabilizing hostile régimes, and advancing Soviet interests.
- The USSR pursues different policies toward different types of revolutionary groups that conduct terrorist activities (that is, hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and the victimization of innocent civilians).
- Whether terrorist tactics are used in the course of revolutionary violence is largely a matter of indifference to the Soviets, who have no scruples against them. The Soviet attitude is determined by whether those tactics advance or harm Soviet interests in the particular circumstances. Revolutionary groups that employ terrorist tactics are simply one among the many instruments of Soviet foreign policy.
- There is conclusive evidence that the USSR directly or indirectly supports a large number of national insurgencies ¹ and some separatist-irredentist ² groups. Many of these entities, of both types, carry out terrorist activities as part of their larger programs of revolutionary violence. A notable example of Soviet involvement is the case of El Salvador, where the Soviets have coordinated and directly participated in the delivery of arms to revolutionary groups that use terrorism as a basic tactic.
- Some revolutionary groups that employ terrorism do accept a measure of Soviet control and direction, but many do not.
- The International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party has primary responsibility for managing contacts with movements in opposition to established govern-

¹ *National insurgencies* are broad-based movements which seek to transform the fundamental political orientation of a society by armed revolutionary means. Examples of such groups which the USSR supports or has supported are SWAPO (in Namibia) and ZAPU (in the former Rhodesia).

² *Separatist-irredentist movements* believe that they constitute nations without states and seek to assert their national autonomy or independence. Examples of such movements which the USSR supports or has supported are several of the Palestinian groups.

ments. The KGB, the GRU, and the 10th Directorate of the Soviet General Staff provide a broad range of military and paramilitary training to members of revolutionary groups, in various camps in the USSR and elsewhere, and provide arms and other assistance to a wide spectrum of revolutionary groups in the world, particularly Palestinians, Africans, and Latin Americans.³ Much of this support is readily utilizable in terrorist activities.

- The Soviets support certain allied or friendly governments and entities—notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, East European states, South Yemen, and Cuba—which in turn directly or indirectly support the terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of violent revolutionaries, including certain of the world's nihilistic terrorist groups.⁴
- The USSR accepts these support actions of its allies and friends. It does so on occasion because these actions also serve Soviet interests and on other occasions because they are part of the price to be paid for maintaining and increasing its influence with allies and friends. The USSR has not made its backing for them contingent on their desisting from aiding nihilistic terrorists or other violent revolutionaries. In this sense, Moscow is wittingly providing support, albeit indirectly, to international terrorism.
- With respect to Soviet policy toward nihilistic, purely terrorist groups, available evidence remains thin and in some respects contradictory, even though the human intelligence collection programs of the United States and its friends have been giving this problem close scrutiny for some years.
- The activities of some of the nihilistic terrorist groups are carried out by individuals trained by Soviet friends and allies that provide them with weapons; such terrorists have sometimes transited Soviet Bloc nations. Yet the terrorist activities of these groups are not coordinated by the Soviets.⁵

³ See annexes A and B for details.

⁴ *Nihilists* are small groups, with little public support, which rely almost exclusively on terrorist acts to destroy existing institutions to make way for new ones. Leading examples are the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany, the Japanese Red Army, and the Red Brigades in Italy, which profess the view that Western institutions are their major antagonists.

⁵ *Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe that the Soviets do provide some coordination to nihilistic terrorists either directly through the contacts of Soviet advisers with these terrorists in training camps in Middle Eastern countries, or elsewhere, or indirectly through East European countries, Cubans, Palestinians, or other entities through which the Soviets work.*

- The Soviets have on occasion privately characterized certain nihilistic terrorism as "criminal," and have urged other revolutionary groups to cease and desist from terrorist acts the Soviets considered "self-defeating."*
- Public protestations by the Soviets that they do not back terrorism are compromised by the indirect Soviet support received by certain nihilistic terrorists, as well as by the direct support the Soviets afford to national insurrections and separatist-irredentist movements which conduct terrorist acts.
- The Soviet policy of differentiated support of various kinds of revolutionary violence benefits Soviet overall interests at low risk or cost, and without significant damage to Soviet prestige. It is therefore likely to continue.
- There is no basis for supposing that the Soviets could be persuaded to join the West in genuine opposition to international terrorism as a whole.
- The broader phenomenon of revolutionary violence is a more significant and complex issue for the United States than is its terrorist component per se. The severe instabilities that exist in many settings in the Third World are chronic, will not soon be overcome, and in many instances would continue to exist regardless of the USSR.
- There is no simple or single solution to these problems because of the variety and complexity of circumstances leading to revolutionary violence and terrorism. In every case, the indicated measures include a mixture of three approaches: reduction or elimination of external support, police and/or military action to combat violence, and the opening of channels for peaceful change.

* Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe that this judgment is misleading. Moscow has not supported terroristic activities which it considers counterproductive. The holders of this view note, however, that, as stated in the fourth Key Judgment (page 1), on other occasions "the Soviets have coordinated and directly participated in the delivery of arms to revolutionary groups that use terrorism as a basic tactic."

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Scope Note

1. This Estimate deals with the nature of Soviet support for international terrorism, within the broader framework of revolutionary violence. The Estimate (a) examines such support in several contexts and with respect to various types of revolutionary violence; (b) indicates the degree to which the Soviets directly or indirectly support international terrorism; (c) assesses how international terrorism may contribute to Soviet foreign policy objectives; (d) assesses the degree to which the perpetrators of revolutionary violence, particularly those who resort to terrorism, are dependent on Soviet support; and (e) identifies the significance for Soviet and for US interests of the several variants of revolutionary violence.

2. Terrorism—hijackings, assassinations, kidnappings, bombings, and other acts that victimize innocent civilians—is a frequent component of revolutionary violence; i.e., violence aimed at undermining or overthrowing a political status quo. The demarcation between terrorism and guerrilla and paramilitary activities is sometimes murky.

3. Revolutionary violence manifests itself in the form of national insurgencies, separatist-irredentist movements, and nihilistic groups.

— National insurgencies are broad-based movements which seek to transform the fundamental orientation of a society by armed revolutionary means. Examples of such groups which the USSR supports or has supported are SWAPO (in Namibia) and ZAPU (in the former Rhodesia).

— Separatist-irredentist movements believe that they constitute nations without states and seek to

assert their national autonomy or independence. The Palestinian groups which the USSR supports or has supported exemplify such movements.

— Nihilists are small groups with little public support which rely almost exclusively on terrorist acts to destroy existing institutions to make way for new ones. Examples are the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany, the Japanese Red Army, and the Red Brigades in Italy, which profess the view that Western institutions are their major antagonists.

B. Nature of the Evidence

4. Human intelligence, particularly clandestine, is the principal source of information on Soviet assistance to violent revolutionaries. The coverage of such revolutionaries varies greatly by region. Evidence is fairly good concerning Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East; it is less certain concerning Western Europe.

— Reporting on Soviet links to separatists-irredentists is mixed

5. It should be noted that the differences of judgment within the Intelligence Community on certain of these matters relate primarily to the validity and interpretation of the evidence and the degree to which circumstantial evidence and the logic of given situations permit confident judgments beyond available documentation.

II. THE USSR, REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

A. Soviet Interest in Revolutionary Violence and Terrorism as Instruments of Soviet Foreign Policy

6. The USSR and several countries with which it has close ties are the principal backers of the revolutionary violence that is such a prominent feature of contemporary international politics. Moscow's leaders

¹ The Intelligence Community assigns more demanding criteria to the accuracy of sourcing and reporting on these questions of terrorism than do most journalists. The publication of *The Terror Network* by Claire Sterling and the selections in the press have created a great deal of interest inside and outside the Intelligence Community. Although well-written and extensively documented, amassing information in public sources, the book is uneven and the reliability of its sources varies widely. Significant portions are correct; others are incorrect or written without attending to important detail. Sterling's conclusion is that the Soviets are not coordinating world-wide terrorism from some central point, but that they are contributing to it in several ways. "It was never part of the Soviet design to create and watch over native terrorist movements, still less attempt to direct their day-to-day activities" (p. 291).

² Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe it is inappropriate to single out one publication of many on this subject. The last sentence of footnote 7 is a selective quote. More appropriate quotes of Sterling's conclusions are found on other pages of her book:

— "The whole point of the (Soviet) plan was to let the other fellow do it, contributing to continental terror by proxy." (page 292)

— "In effect, the Soviet Union had simply laid a loaded gun on the table, leaving others to get on with it." (page 293)

Moreover, Soviet support for terrorism and revolutionary violence has moved beyond the passive or indirect stage, and has become more active, as is reflected in paragraph 42 of the Estimate, describing Moscow's nurturing of terrorist movements in Latin America.

consider revolutionary groups that employ terrorist tactics to be simply one among the many instruments in the USSR's total foreign policy arsenal of diplomatic, economic, military, propaganda, and subversive weapons. The combined purpose of these instruments is to facilitate what Soviet leaders believe to be an inevitable march of history toward a world "correlation of forces" increasingly favorable to the USSR and the Soviet Communist Party. To the degree that revolutionary violence contributes to that process, it is supported. When terrorism occurs, it is accepted or opposed as circumstances dictate.

7. Revolutionary violence occurs in a variety of contexts—broad insurgency movements in the Third World (e.g., SWAPO in Namibia), ethnic and religious separatism in the Third World and on the fringes of Europe (e.g., the Armenians in Turkey and the Basques in Spain), nihilism in Western Europe (e.g., the Red Brigades in Italy), and the covert terrorist activities of states against one another (e.g., Libyan terrorism against Egypt). In some cases, terrorism is an offshoot of broader militant activities. But in other cases (e.g., the European nihilists and several of the Palestinian separatist groups) terrorism is a fundamental mode of operation.

8. Soviet support of revolutionary violence is particularly generous in those situations where Soviet leaders conclude that revolutionaries stand a good chance of transforming an existing political system into one that is more amenable to Moscow or less favorable to Western interests. Moscow prefers to refer to these groups as "national liberation" movements. Since the definition of "national liberation" is flexible enough to cover the subversion of any regime disliked by the Soviets, and since guerrilla tactics often include terrorism, the net result is that the terrorist activities of the groups receive substantial Soviet support.

9. Moscow favors groups that are, or that can transform themselves into or join with, mass movements utilizing large-scale agitational, guerrilla, and paramilitary tactics. It does so for several reasons:

— Such movements enjoy greater prospects for success than small bands of terrorists because they attract greater indigenous support and are more likely to be regarded as legitimate expressions of popular aspirations by the Third World and various elements in the West.

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Such movements, because they need large-scale military assistance, are more dependent on the USSR than are small bands, and are therefore more susceptible to Soviet influence.

10. The key factor in the Soviet calculus, however, is clearly not a particular method of operation, such as insurgency or terrorism, but what particular mixture of diplomatic, military, economic, or subversive instruments best advances overall Soviet foreign policy interests in each given situation and at each juncture in time. Whether terrorism occurs in such situations is largely a matter of indifference to the Soviets, who have no particular scruples against it; what is of central importance to them is that the tactics of those whom they assist are effective in advancing broad Soviet interests. When the opportunity is presented, moreover, Moscow does not hesitate to seek political or propaganda advantages from the activities of terrorists, as in the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran and the recent hijacking of a Pakistani airliner to Kabul.

11. Where the status or activities of particular revolutionaries are deemed of lesser importance to Soviet interests than are competing groups or good relations with the host government, support to them is usually subordinated to the broader imperatives of overall Soviet policy. The avowed position of the Soviets is that they oppose terrorism, but this public position is compromised by Soviet activities that aid groups that use terrorism.

B. Soviet Infrastructure and Revolutionary Violence

12. As in the case of all other aspects of Soviet foreign policy making, the ultimate locus of decisions concerning Soviet support for movements in opposition to established governments is the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The Soviets give public support to various revolutionary movements, and revolutionary leaders have regularly

attended Soviet party congresses. Individual Politburo members have met with the leaders of some groups that have engaged in terrorist activities, including Oliver Tambo of the ANC, Yasir Arafat of the PLO, and Samuel Nujoma of SWAPO.*

13. Under the Politburo, all aspects of Soviet national security policy are coordinated by the Central Committee bureaucracy. Within the Central Committee apparatus, the International Department of the Central Committee has primary responsibility for the day-to-day management of Soviet contacts with nonruling Communist parties and revolutionary movements abroad. The International Department (ID) is run by Boris Ponomarev and Mikhail Suslov—the chief Soviet ideologue, senior party secretary, and a full Politburo member—and has long had responsibilities in the area of Soviet relations with foreign Communist parties and leftist movements. The ID is almost certainly the principal link between the USSR's top policymakers and those revolutionary movements which the Soviets support. It is reasonable to assume that the ID makes policy recommendations to the Politburo concerning the terrorist activities of these movements.

14. A number of Soviet embassies have ID personnel on their staffs. They perform both a liaison and an advisory function in contacts with foreign leftist movements and pro-Soviet parties. The ID also appears to have responsibility for providing funds to such groups, though in some instances the mechanics of passing funds have been handled by the KGB.

15. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) appears to play a more limited role than the ID with regard to Soviet contact with nonruling parties, both Communist and non-Communist, and with illegal pro-Soviet organizations. This reflects a division of labor wherein the MFA is responsible for state-to-state relations with foreign governments, while the Central Committee apparatus deals with foreign political parties and movements.

C. Soviet Policy Toward Various Kinds of Revolutionary Violence¹⁰

16. Soviet support of national insurgencies is longstanding. The Soviets seek to justify their support by

* See annex A, paragraphs 13, 55, and 56.

¹⁰ See annex A for greater detail.

describing such insurgencies as "national liberation" movements. There is abundant evidence of training of Third World insurgents within the USSR as well as in Cuba, South Yemen, various Palestinian camps, and probably Eastern Europe. The Soviets also provide large quantities of arms and considerable advice to such insurgents and their patrons. Some of those trained and equipped by the Soviets or their friends and allies make their way into strictly terrorist groups.

17. The USSR also has ties with some groups in the second general type of revolutionary movement, the ethnic and religious separatists who constitute a widespread source of revolutionary violence in contemporary politics and are major employers of terrorist activities.¹¹ Direct Soviet support goes largely to separatists-irredentists that the Soviets believe will further their foreign policy objectives in critical areas, such as the Middle East. Fringe groups, however, also derive benefit from Soviet largess to the extent that they attend training camps in the USSR (and possibly Eastern Europe), or in such countries as Cuba, Libya, and South Yemen that have close relations with Moscow. Also, East Bloc arms have been sent to the most violent of the separatists by Warsaw Pact countries and by groups and regimes with close political and military ties to the USSR, like Fatah, Libya, Iraq, and Syria. Certain separatist groups have also received funding and false documents from regimes that enjoy close relations with the USSR.

18. Soviet policy toward the third general type of revolutionaries, the nihilistic, strictly terrorist groups,¹² is quite different. The USSR has often condemned nihilistic terrorism in public and on occasion in private. Soviet leaders apparently consider its main practitioners to be uncontrollable adventurers whose

¹¹ Such groups view themselves as autonomous communities that are victims of oppression. Whether they have links with the USSR or not, all separatists share a self-perception of deprived nationhood. Some are collections of exiles like the Croatian, Armenian, and Moluccan separatists. Others function within large ethnic communities in their own countries—Northern Irish Catholics, Philippine Moros, Iranian Kurds, or Spanish Basques. Separatists-irredentists strive to create the conditions for civil or guerrilla warfare (as have various Palestinian groups against Israel), but they also resort to terrorism. Terrorism has been a major instrument in the arsenal of separatist groups like the Basque ETA, the Armenian ASALA, and the Provisional wing of the IRA.

¹² For example, Baader-Meinhof, the Italian Red Brigades, the Japanese Red Army.

behavior antagonizes other governments unduly, provokes reaction damaging to their interests, and on occasion endangers Soviet personnel or undermines the Soviet objective of fomenting more broadly based revolutionary movements. Nonetheless, some nihilists appear in the training camps of Soviet friends, and have received funding and East Bloc arms from a variety of sources. The Soviets have not made their support for these friends contingent on their desisting from aiding nihilistic terrorism. In addition, individual nihilists have appeared behind the Iron Curtain and have found refuge in Eastern Europe and Cuba.

19. In recent years, a fourth type of terrorism has become more pronounced—terrorism as a state instrument, notably in the Middle East against hostile states and dissidents living abroad. There, terrorism has been conducted between Syria and Iraq, and Israel and the Palestinians. South Yemen has employed terrorism against North Yemen and Oman; Libya has used it against Egypt; and Syria has initiated terrorism against Jordan. Libya, Syria, Iran, Chile, and Bulgaria have terrorized dissidents living abroad. In a number of cases, the regimes employing terrorism have close relations with the USSR, and the Soviets have good reason to share their dislike of some of the targets, such as the Sadat government in Egypt.

D. Soviet Activities That Benefit Terrorists

20. The USSR and its allies and friends provide military and political training for large numbers of Third World activists: supply arms to nations and organizations that back terrorists, without imposing or implementing controls over use or transfer; and are known on occasion to have permitted the transit of terrorists through their territory and to have given them safehaven.

21. *Training.* Thousands of Third World revolutionaries have been provided military training within the USSR and Eastern Europe. Such training includes the use of weapons, sabotage, clandestine organization, and communications—all of value to those interested in conducting insurgencies, but of value as well to would-be terrorists.

29. In addition to the training of revolutionaries in the USSR, the Soviets also provide advisers for training facilities in other countries (Cuba, Libya, South Yemen). In these situations, the revolutionary groups involved appoint the students, and the Soviets are fully aware that some of the skills acquired have been used to commit terrorist acts.

30. The Soviets, according to some allegations, get assistance from Warsaw Pact allies in the training of foreign insurgents." Such use of the East Bloc would be advantageous to the USSR, by promoting both the appearance and the reality of a unified Communist effort to assist Third World revolutionary movements.

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In date, we have reports (largely unconfirmed) of a number of training sites in Czechoslovakia, one in Poland, and several—unspecified—in Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.

31. The description of training indicates that most instruction focuses on paramilitary/guerrilla-type activities. Sources describe instruction in small arms, small-unit tactics, the use of explosives, communications, and intelligence gathering.¹¹ This training is more than adequate preparation for most terrorist activities.

32. **Arms Supplies.** In recent years, the Soviets and others have made extensive arms deliveries to the Third World. One consequence of these arms transfers has been the ready availability of weapons for terrorists. Major Soviet arms shipments go to Cuba, Libya, and the Palestinians (via Syria). The Soviets are fully aware that some of these are transferred to terrorists. In the case of El Salvador the Soviets have coordinated and directly participated in the delivery of arms to guerrilla/terrorist groups. The support and encouragement given by the Cubans to a broad range of Latin American radical groups, the support by Libya and South Yemen to various Palestinian and Third World groups, and the links which those groups in turn have with terrorist organizations facilitate access of these groups to modern weapons and explosives. However, small arms of multiple national origin are readily available from a variety of sources to terrorist groups.

33. The most dramatic instances of Soviet-made weapons ending up in the hands of terrorists involve

"Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe that, although evidence of terrorist training at sites in Eastern Europe is not as well documented as reporting of sites in the Middle East, it should not be evaluated as 'largely unconfirmed.' The holders of this view believe that the reporting which is available supports their belief that training of terrorists has taken place in Eastern Europe."

¹¹ There are only two reports indicating that the Soviets may go beyond strictly guerrilla-type training.

Another report claims that the Soviets were teaching techniques for attacking persons from moving vehicles and the placing of explosives in various places (including luggage in train stations), for hostage taking, and for public intimidation.

the SA-7 man-portable antiaircraft missile.¹² Two such missiles were found in the possession of a group of Palestinian terrorists in Rome in September 1973; they reportedly were to have been used to shoot down an Israeli passenger plane as it landed in Rome. The missiles probably had been given to the Syrians for more conventional military use and subsequently found their way into the hands of the Palestinian terrorists in Italy. In January 1976 the Kenyans apprehended five members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) preparing to use SA-7s against an incoming Israeli airliner in Nairobi. In this case, the missiles had been supplied by Libya and smuggled into Nairobi with Somali assistance. SA-7s were used by the ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union) forces in Rhodesia twice, in 1978 and 1979, to shoot down Viscount passenger planes; the weapons had probably been delivered to ZAPU by the Soviet Union via Zambia or Angola. In November 1979 Italian authorities found two SA-7 missiles in a van near the small Adriatic port of Ortona. Three Italians in the van were members of the nihilistic group Workers Autonomy; a Jordanian involved in the incident was a PFLP member. The issue of the ultimate destination of the missiles was never resolved.

34. Although it is clear that many revolutionary insurgents and separatists are the direct and indirect recipients of Soviet arms, there is only limited information about the sources of arms to West European

As noted above, the PFLP appears to be an arms conduit to the Workers Autonomy group in Italy and also possibly to the Red Brigades, which have used Czechoslovak arms.

35. **Transit and Safehaven.** Over the years, a number of terrorists have traveled in the USSR and Eastern Europe, particularly in East Germany. PFLP leaders, George Habbash and the late Wadi Haddad, received medical treatment in Eastern Europe. A Japanese Red Army activist, Black September organization members, PFLP terrorists, and a group of

¹² See annex A for Soviet criticism of terrorist attacks against civilian targets.

Arab terrorists carrying explosives were reportedly identified in East Germany at different times. There have been unconfirmed reports that members of the Red Army Faction (Baader-Meinhof) have crossed into East Germany. There has also been [] reporting that members of the Italian Red Brigades have crossed into Eastern Europe, notably Czechoslovakia, and [] have been met and escorted by Czechoslovak officials. However, the reliability of this reporting is open to question. T

39. *Eastern Europe.* East Germany and Czechoslovakia, whose policies are carefully coordinated with Moscow and are subject to its veto, have served most frequently as Soviet partners in support of insurgency and separatist movements which frequently use terrorism as well as engage in paramilitary operations. They also support states that in turn engage in terrorism or directly back terrorists. In addition, terrorists have transited some East European countries. Bulgaria smuggles arms on a large scale into Turkey, where the weapons reach various criminals and terrorists. 19

40. *Cuba.* The USSR and Cuba are pursuing the same objective—establishment of ideologically sympathetic regimes in the Third World—and they work closely together. Most Cuban policy is not directed or controlled by the Soviets; however, if it were not for the extensive Soviet military and economic aid to Cuba, that country would be unable to engage in large-scale operations outside its borders. In recent years, Cuba has been in the lead in urging armed struggle in Latin America, and the Soviets have become more actively supportive of late. The Cubans, and more recently the Soviets, clearly support organizations and groups in Latin America that use terrorism as a basic technique in their efforts to undermine existing regimes. T

J .
E. The Role of Soviet Allies, Associates, and Clients

37. The Soviets rely heavily on intermediaries in their efforts to advance revolution, particularly in the Third World. The most prominent are the Cubans, the Palestinians, and the Libyans. South Yemen provides camps and training to revolutionary forces targeted against conservative Arab regimes and other governments. There are other conduits, including Vietnam, North Korea, Syria, and Algeria, that at one time or another have channeled Soviet arms and/or funds to the perpetrators of revolutionary violence.

38. Moscow exerts varying degrees of control and influence over its allies and friends, depending in part on the target and region of activities. In Africa, for example, even though the Cubans have some objectives of their own, they basically follow Soviet direction. [] Cuba has more leeway in Latin America, however, and supports some Latin American revolutionaries at its own initiative and discretion. By the same token, Libya's terrorist activities are likely staged at Qadhafi's own initiative. The Soviets receive considerable infusions of hard currency from their arms sales to Libya, and a number of Soviet interests in promoting instability are served when Qadhafi transfers funds and Soviet arms to revolutionary forces in Africa, the Middle East, or elsewhere.

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40. In short, the USSR and Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term coordinated campaign to establish sympathetic Latin American regimes. In this effort, Cuba and other Soviet friends and allies are playing the more direct roles in supporting revolutionary groups. Intensified Soviet activity in this region portends an increase in terrorist behavior there.

44. *Libya.* Libya is a major and direct supporter of international terrorism and has purchased large quantities of arms from the USSR. Although Libya is not controlled by the USSR, Libyan and Soviet short-term goals have often been complementary. Because the current relationship benefits the USSR in a number of ways, it is highly improbable that Moscow would seek to pressure Libya to withdraw support from terrorists.

45. While Libya's oil revenues allow it to shop widely for arms and development assistance, it has spent heavily in the Soviet Bloc. Currently, there are more than 1,000 Soviet and 24,000 East European civilian technicians in Libya. Nearly 1,700 military advisers from the Bloc are active in every branch of the Libyan armed forces. The Soviets have sold Libya quantities of weaponry far in excess of the capability of the Libyan forces alone to use. Moscow has not restricted the transfer of equipment—mainly light arms—by the Libyans to third parties.

46. *The Palestinians.* The Soviets have long supported the Palestinians and their umbrella organization, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Together with their East European allies, the Soviets provide the single most important source of arms purchased by the Palestinians. In the last 10 years alone, the Soviets have provided thousands of Palestinians with military and paramilitary training in facilities in the USSR and elsewhere. Those trained have included members of organizations such as the PFLP and the Syrian-dominated Sa'iq which have engaged in terror-

50. El Salvador is the most prominent current target of the Palestinians in Latin America. During 1980, Palestinians trained some 200 Salvadoran rebels in Lebanon.

51. South Yemen, the Marxist Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen—currently under Soviet tutelage and long a major crossroads for international terrorists and radical insurgents—provides training, weapons, transit, safehaven, forged passports, and other services. For ideological and economic reasons, Moscow has greater influence in the PDRY than in any other country in the Middle East. The ruling Yemeni Socialist Party is committed to a variety of objectives with which the Soviets sympathize: the export of revolution to the Persian Gulf, rebellion in Oman, subversion in North Yemen and Saudi Arabia, and the promotion of radical causes in general. The Aden regime signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow in 1979, holds observer status in the Soviet Bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA), and is dependent on Bloc assistance.

workers of the West and the colonial or formerly colonial peoples of what we now call the Third World are, or will become, natural allies of the USSR and its Communist Party. For Western workers that doctrine has generally been invalidated by the failure of most of them to be attracted to Soviet Communism to any significant degree. But Soviet doctrinal faith with respect to the Third World has substantially more to sustain it. The enormous weaknesses of all kinds which exist there are susceptible to Soviet exploitation—the fragility of political, social, and economic institutions, the many passionate tribal and ethnic separatist ambitions, the many disputes between and among these states, the experience of those countries with Western but not with Soviet colonialism, the existence of the rich US scapegoat, and widespread dissatisfaction with certain US policies. All these offer visions to Moscow of Communist advance, hurried along by Soviet exploitation.

54. This prospect helps explain why the Soviets have made such a concerted effort, for so many years, to train Third World people of all walks of life. At relatively little cost, but with consistent aim, these programs have been extended not only to Third World leaders, military personnel, engineers, educators, and the like, but to revolutionaries as well. Hence the USSR has developed its wide-ranging programs of direct and indirect support for many kinds of revolutionary violence in the Third World, in the expectation that Soviet interests will be accordingly advanced. For similar reasons of self-interest, Soviet policy is quite different with respect to nihilistic, purely terrorist groups. Many of them operate in a wholly different, European setting, have little popular support, may generate reactions that set back the fortunes of revolutionary movements, engage in activities that could harm Soviet installations and personnel, and may damage relations with West European and some Third World countries.

III. SIGNIFICANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

A. For the USSR

53. Since the Bolshevik capture of power in Russia, one of the principal, consistent tenets of Lenin, Stalin, and their successors has been that the proletarian

55. Support of revolutionary violence, including its terrorist component, provides Moscow with a means of inciting or exploiting violent and destabilizing conflict on a regional as well as global scale, with small risk of US retaliation or direct military confrontation with the United States. Terrorism in Third World regions has frequently occurred in the initial stage of an insurgency. It is subsequently used in conjunction with insurgent activities that are designed to undermine the established government. The intent is to promote

Soviet objectives and to expand Moscow's influence and presence in areas of the Third World, including those which supply oil and other vital raw materials or which lie on the access routes to these strategic resources.

56. Soviet support of revolutionary movements that employ terrorism is sometimes an effective and cheap means of fostering instability, thus confronting the United States with a difficult choice: to aid shaky authoritarian governments in the difficult problem of establishing order over the long term, or to accept disorder and reduce the American presence. Also, where Soviet support of revolutionary movements aids their accession to power, such regimes then provide the Soviets with platforms and surrogates for beginning or accelerating the terrorist-revolutionary cycle anew in neighboring countries.

57. Soviet support for national insurgencies in the Third World reflects a number of foreign policy aims. These include:

- Establishment of anti-Western regimes sympathetic to Soviet interests.
- Attempts to weaken or undermine governments that are friendly to the United States, as in El Salvador and elsewhere in Central America and the Caribbean.
- Opportunities to acquire potential strategic advantages, as in southern Africa and the Middle East.
- The cultivating of ties to "future leaders," such as Samuel Nujoma of SWAPO.
- The undercutting of competitive Chinese influence, and the cultivating of pro-Soviet factions of insurgent movements, as in Soviet support for ZAPU in Zimbabwe.
- The enhancing of the USSR's diplomatic stature by supporting the "legitimate revolutionary aspirations" of "oppressed peoples," as reflected in Soviet support for black nationalist insurgents opposed to the government of South Africa.

58. The Soviet Union has encouraged a few separatist movements that threaten the stability of regimes friendly to the United States or hostile to Moscow. Even the threat of such encouragement provides Moscow with leverage against countries like Yugoslavia and Pakistan. On occasion, actual assistance may be

rendered to separatists by Moscow in order to pressure a regime to conform to Soviet wishes.

59. Soviet support for the PLO, the major separatist-irredentist group receiving Soviet aid, derives from both regional and international interests. It helps assure Moscow of continuing diplomatic entree to the Arab states in the Middle East and to Palestinian supporters more broadly throughout North Africa. It provides leverage for Moscow's campaign against the Camp David accords. It allows the USSR to pose as the patron of the struggle against Israel, in turn contributing to the dependence of some radical Arab states on Soviet military aid and political support. It creates the potential for undermining US influence among pro-Western regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, that oppose Israeli policies. Indirectly, it may enhance Moscow's ability to press for a more extensive Soviet strategic presence in the region in the form of port facilities, base rights, and military advisers. And it gives Moscow another dimension in promoting revolution in Latin America. Given such a range of significant advantages stemming from the Palestinian connection, Soviet leaders appear for the most part to look the other way with respect to Palestinian terrorist activities, even some that do not profit Soviet interests.

B. For the United States

60. *General US Interests.* US policy has traditionally been to encourage evolutionary change and non-violent processes of reform, together with the free international movement of persons, goods, and ideas—looking toward a world markedly different from what the Soviets prefer. Revolutionary violence and terrorism threaten to unleash sudden and dangerous crises, which endanger the stability of friendly regimes, preoccupy governments for prolonged periods of time (as did the Iranian revolution and the subsequent seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran), and can lead to outright regional warfare. Such violence places considerable strain on a number of US allies and friends—among them Israel, Great Britain, Turkey, Italy, Pakistan, Spain, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Colombia. Some of these governments may be overthrown by violence, and others may be paralyzed. Or, revolutionary violence and terrorism may spread suddenly to hitherto stable and peaceful countries, as in Uruguay in the late 1960s and early 1970s, or perhaps Costa Rica in the 1980s.

61. The West continues to be the principal site of international terrorism. In 1980 more than 30 percent of all recorded incidents of international terrorism took place in Western Europe. The symbols of American power and prosperity are by far the most frequent targets of international terrorism. In 1980 there were almost 300 attacks on Americans, including 113 incidents involving US diplomats—the largest number of attacks on diplomats on record. The widespread and sustained nature of the terrorist threat to US interests is illustrated by the fact that in 1980 Americans were the victims of terrorist attacks in 51 countries, most frequently in El Salvador, Turkey, the Philippines, West Germany, and Colombia. With the notable exception of Puerto Rico, the territory of the United States still has been largely spared the ravages of international terrorist violence.²²

62. International terrorists choose American targets for several reasons. American personnel and property are highly visible and vulnerable to terrorists. Additionally, most terrorists seek to undermine the existing political and social order, and the United States is identified as the world's leading status quo power, the heart of international capitalism, and the ally or friend of regimes that terrorists seek to overthrow. American targets have high symbolic value for "anti-imperialists," and attacks on Americans are particularly embarrassing to host governments.

63. Terrorism also has a significantly detrimental effect on private US interests. Because of the inability of the United States or most governments to provide adequate protection, US corporations have been driven to adopting radical expedients to safeguard their property and personnel.²³ Currently, there are about 40 private US counterterrorist firms that offer an impressive panoply of services: electronic perimeter defenses, information on terrorists, and even paramilitary operations against terrorists. US-based

²² American interests and citizens are not the only targets of international terrorism. The Soviets themselves have been occasional targets; 20 of their embassies have been attacked, and Aeroflot, the Soviet state airline, has been the target of several attacks. In 1980, 41 known attacks were made upon Soviet citizens and installations (not counting those in Afghanistan). This includes at least 14 Soviet military officers assassinated in Syria, Turkey, Iraq, France, Iran, and Israel were victims of many international terrorist attacks in 1980 as well.

²³ In one case, Texas industrialist H. Ross Perot in 1978 organized and carried out a private commando raid to free a number of his employees from an Iranian prison.

corporations have reason to be concerned, as they were forced to pay about \$125 million in ransom alone during the 1970s. They also incurred property damage and other costs. Terrorism, moreover, has an inhibiting effect on the flow of US investment abroad, and its costs are calculated as part of "overhead" by firms making investment decisions.

64. In all cases of revolutionary terrorism, important resources are drained away to fight the terrorist threat. And, if violence persists, elements in the affected societies may, out of frustration, be tempted to seek authoritarian solutions to their "terrorist problem." With the consequent radicalization of politics, the way may then be open to the capture of power by extremists of either left or right. Thus, revolutionary violence and terrorism have played important roles in provoking military takeovers in Turkey and Uruguay, and in the recent abortive Spanish coup.

65. The broader phenomenon of revolutionary violence is a more significant and complex issue for the United States than its terrorist component per se. The problem of revolutionary violence lies near the heart of a general contradiction facing US policy in much of the Third World: how best to defend US interests and to support peaceful change where the choices are often between "friendly" but ineffective regimes and other parties that might come to dominate tomorrow's scene but are radical in nature and often hostile to US interests. The severe instabilities that exist in many settings are chronic; they will not soon be overcome, and in many instances they would continue to exist regardless of the USSR. As it is, however, these instabilities—and the resulting contradictions for US policy—are made more pronounced by Soviet exploitation.

66. The problems for the United States are further complicated in those settings where revolutionary movements with some popular backing resort to terrorist acts, as occurred, for example, in the case of the ZANU, a movement led by the present Prime Minister of Zimbabwe,²⁴ and the Mau Mau in Kenya in the 1950s. In that region, moreover, the United States runs the risk of antagonizing all of black Africa by appearing to side with South Africa in its opposition to revolutionary violence, thus inadvertently becoming tarred as a supporter of apartheid.

²⁴ In the case of Zimbabwe it proved ironic that the USSR happened to be backing the unsuccessful, rival revolutionary group ZAPU.

67. Revolutionary violence and terrorism are forms of warfare that fall below the threshold of US conventional and nuclear deterrence. Most governments, including the US, are unable to deter terrorists. This inability poses a significant challenge to US credibility and prestige, and affects US ability to carry out commitments to endangered friends or allies. The Soviets are naturally aware of these US dilemmas and seek to exploit promising revolutionary opportunities as they arise, generally regardless of whether terrorism is involved.

68. There is no simple or single solution to these problems because of the variety and complexity of circumstances leading to revolutionary violence and terrorism. In every case, the indicated measures include a mixture of three approaches: reduction or elimination of external support, police and/or military action to combat violence, and the opening of channels for peaceful change.

69. *Regional US Interests.* Because of regional variations in the levels of revolutionary violence and terrorism, differences in the sources of such violence, and differences in the degree of Soviet support, threats to US interests vary considerably by region.

70. The most significant threats are in the Middle East, where the Soviets are able to take advantage of radical and conservative Arab nationalism and strong criticism of US policies with respect to the Palestinians. Terrorists might seriously threaten US interests in this region by:

- Sabotaging petroleum facilities.
- Undermining conservative Arab governments and destabilizing Egypt.
- Weakening Israeli security.

71. *Latin America.* Cuba—now assisted by Nicaragua—is in partnership with the USSR in fomenting guerrilla/terrorist activity in this region, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. The danger from the US point of view is due in part to the proximity of the violence to the United States itself and to major friends like Mexico and Venezuela. Revolutionary violence has been substantially reduced in recent years in the larger countries of South America. Accordingly, the key threats to US interests in this region include:

- Overthrowing the government of El Salvador.
- Destabilizing Guatemala, Honduras, and perhaps Costa Rica.

- Endangering the security of the Panama Canal.
- Promoting instability in the Caribbean and installing additional radical regimes like that in Grenada.
- Weakening democracy in Colombia and perhaps eventually Venezuela.
- Creating substantial new pressures on Mexico in the event of a significant expansion of radical regimes in Central America.

72. *Europe.* The present military regime in Turkey has reduced the incidence of revolutionary violence in that country dramatically since assuming power last September, although Turkish interests outside the country are still major targets of Armenian terrorism. In West Germany, the terrorist threat has been small in recent years, although several recent attacks on US installations may signal its revival, and continuing disturbances by leftists in West Berlin will produce social strains in that city. Spain may offer the greatest opportunity for terrorists in the coming months, largely because democratic institutions in that country remain fragile and military figures may be tempted once again to take matters into their own hands if terrorism persists.

73. *Africa.* Soviet involvement in promoting revolutionary violence in Africa is well documented, and terrorism is taking place, especially in Namibia and South Africa. Soviet assistance to the African National Congress (ANC) and SWAPO continues without surcease, and Cuba, East Germany, and Angola are partners with the Soviet Union in promoting revolutionary violence.

74. *East Asia.* The Soviets are assisting Vietnam in its war of conquest against Cambodia, and support Vietnamese raids into Thailand. Otherwise, Soviet involvement in assisting revolutionary violence and terrorism in East Asia is relatively small. There is good evidence that the Soviets do not back the Japanese Red Army or the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.

75. *Support for International Efforts To Combat Terrorism.* The Soviets have adamantly refused to endorse general legal efforts to combat terrorism, basing their opposition on the claim that such conventions are aimed at crippling "national liberation" forces. They have been willing, however, to participate in legislation aimed at specific, well-defined acts of terrorism;

this doubtless reflects a desire not to appear too obstructionist and a perception that they too are vulnerable to certain forms of terrorism.

76. The Soviets are unlikely to modify their refusal to agree to general international measures condemning terrorism. There are a number of reasons for this:

- They do not wish to forgo exploiting and creating revolutionary opportunities.
- They want to avoid the condemnation in international forums of friendly countries like Libya.
- They have an interest in supporting Third World states that believe that US-supported definitions of international terrorism would hamstring national insurgencies but exclude the "terrorist" acts of governments like those of South Africa and Chile.

77. The USSR has participated in several international efforts to control aircraft hijacking and the taking of hostages: it has signed several conventions aimed at combating hijacking, as well as a UN convention concerning the protection of diplomats in 1973. The Soviets also voted in December 1979 for an international convention against the seizure of hostages, but have not yet ratified it.

79. There is no basis for supposing that the Soviets could be persuaded to join the West in opposing all forms of international terrorism, since that position would conflict with their basic backing of what they call "national liberation" movements.

80. Even a complete withdrawal of Soviet support would not put an end to international terrorism. Libya and the extreme Palestinian groups have ample independent resources. The weapons needed for terrorist activities are relatively cheap and readily available in the world. Moreover, in the case of national insurgencies and separatist movements, at least, the basic causes of explosive tension would largely remain. In the important case of Cuba, however, the Soviets probably have it within their power to limit Cuban support for terrorism—even though they show no present signs of wanting to exercise such restraint.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

81. The deep-seated Soviet policy commitment noted throughout this Estimate is to support "revolutionary forces," including what the Soviets call "national liberation movements," by definition seen as pro-Soviet and anti-US. Terrorism is but one tactic used by the revolutionaries. Although it may frequently be seen by Soviet leaders to be productive, they do not support terrorism for its own sake, especially since Soviet complicity in terrorism could, in some instances, cause problems for Soviet interests. Nonetheless, the important considerations the Soviets will continue to weigh in assessing their attitudes toward the feasibility of support for terrorist activities are the local conditions in which these activities occur, the ability to mask Soviet involvement so as to maintain plausible denial, and whether the activities will be effective, productive, and controlled.

82. We believe that these considerations affect the degree to which the Soviet Union is prepared to involve itself in support of terrorist activities. The higher the cost in areas otherwise important to Moscow, particularly where terrorists are not subject to Soviet discipline and control and where the Soviets lack resources to ensure the success of some of the dubious ventures involving terrorism, the more likely Soviet leaders may be to examine closely the advantages of given terrorist tactics. In sum, while raising the cost is unlikely to deter Moscow from pursuit of its basic interests as it sees them, it might in some instances persuade Soviet leaders to advise their clients to show greater restraint in the use of terrorist methods.

ANNEX A

THE REGIONAL RECORD: SOVIET LINKS TO TERRORISTS

I. MIDDLE EAST

1. The Middle East is a caldron of revolutionary violence and international terrorism. Terrorism has assumed a number of faces in this region, including insurgency activity against Morocco, separatism-irredentism in the cases of the Palestinians and the Kurds, nihilism in the occasional forays of the Japanese Red Army, and state terrorism by countries like Libya, Iraq, Iran, and Syria.

2. Soviet behavior has a particularly strong impact on international terrorist activity in the Middle East because of the USSR's close relations with Libya, a notorious backer of international terrorism; with South Yemen, which supports and assists in the training of members of numerous guerrilla/terrorist groups; and with various Palestinian groups, which have been involved in some of the most spectacular terrorist operations of the past decade.

3. The Soviets provide assistance, including training and weapons support, to states and organizations which they know conduct or support terrorist activities. The Soviets themselves do not direct these groups, however, nor do they encourage specific terrorist operations. In some cases, they have advised their friends and allies against the use of such tactics, although they have acquiesced in their use.

Libya

4. In recent years, the USSR and Libya have developed a relationship based largely on Libya's ability and willingness to pay hard currency for the large quantities of arms it receives from the USSR. While the ideologies and long-term objectives of the two nations remain incompatible in many respects, they share a number of goals, such as the undermining of Egypt's President Sadat and the fostering of certain radical and anti-Western elements in the Middle East and Africa. The two nations frequently follow complementary policies in the region.

5. Libya, the region's most active state supporter of international terrorist groups, had supported terrorist activities well before the significant improvement in its relationship with the USSR in the mid-1970s. The Soviets undoubtedly knew this and knew that some of the weapons they sold to Qadhafi would be diverted for terrorist purposes.

6. To our knowledge, the Soviets have not tried to prevent Qadhafi from supporting terrorist activities. Qadhafi would probably be unresponsive to any request that he not transfer their arms to international terrorist groups, and the Soviets will probably continue to accept his activities unless such Libyan-backed terrorism provokes counterresponses that could endanger their investment or interests in Libya and the region.

South Yemen

7. During the 1970s the USSR developed an increasingly close relationship with South Yemen. The two countries, although frequently differing over tactics, share a commitment to support leftist and disident groups in the Arabian Peninsula and elsewhere.

F

Palestinian Groups

9. The Soviets have long provided political and material support to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), an umbrella organization which represents many Palestinian groups, including several that engage in terrorist activities. Several of these groups in turn provide training and assistance to other groups, both in the Middle East and elsewhere, that engage in terrorism.

10. Fatah, the largest group in the PLO, is headed by Yasir Arafat, whose policy before 1973 was to engage in terrorism both within Israel and internationally. Since then, he has largely dissociated Fatah from the occupied territories.

Since then, however, the PFLP has been relatively inactive, both within Israel and in international terrorism. This probably reflects the lack of an effective operational leader rather than a policy shift, as Habbash's health has been poor and Wadi Haddad, leader of a PFLP splinter group which conducted terrorist operations, died in March 1978.

11. The Soviets have defended the right of the Palestinians to conduct military operations within the territory occupied by Israel since 1967, and they have refused to criticize such operations publicly or to condemn publicly terrorist actions within Israel.

15. In late 1978, Habbash visited the USSR for the first time in five years; since then the Soviets have increased their material support for his organization. In return, the Soviets may be using the PFLP to maintain liaison with a number of revolutionary and separatist groups.

12. The Soviets and East Europeans have trained Fatah members and provided the organization with arms. Fatah in return has acted as a surrogate for the Soviets on various occasions, providing training and assistance to other groups at Soviet behest.

16. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) is used by the USSR in an intelligence support capacity. It is the Marxist-Leninist organization with the closest political and ideological ties to the USSR of any Palestinian group. The DFLP claims to oppose international terrorism, but tried to conduct terrorist operations in Israel as recently as March 1981.

Fatah has been training Central American revolutionaries since at least 1979.

17. Saiqa is a Palestinian group controlled by Syria, which supplies the group's arms and training and most of its commanders. Members of Saiqa have been trained in the USSR, presumably under Syrian sponsorship. In 1973, a Saiqa team hijacked a train carrying Soviet Jewish emigres in an effort to close down Austrian emigre-processing camps: the terrorists brought weapons into Czechoslovakia and boarded the train in Bratislava, commandeering the train when it passed into Austria; one of the Saiqa members had been trained in the Soviet Union. Another Soviet-trained Saiqa member was arrested in 1975 in Amsterdam, where he and others allegedly also planned to hijack a train. Saiqa has also carried out attacks against Egyptian and Turkish interests, and most recently may have been involved in the kidnaping of a Jordanian diplomat. In Saiqa's involvement in this kidnaping, the group was acting at the behest of the Syrians and not as a Palestinian group promoting Palestinian aims.

14. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) has been the most active Palestinian group in international terrorism.

II. LATIN AMERICA

18. Revolutionary violence has erupted with particular force in Central America, mostly initiated by

insurgency movements. These movements, as in El Salvador, commonly resort to terrorism. Less significant revolutionary violence has taken place recently in South America, with Colombia a particular target of insurgents who practice terrorism. Several Caribbean nations are also potential targets for revolutionary violence.

19. The Soviets have relied heavily on Cuba to advance their common objectives in Latin America. Recently, the Soviets have become more directly involved, providing both logistic support through Nicaragua and propaganda support for armed revolution in El Salvador and Guatemala.

20. Cuba's support and encouragement of a wide variety of guerrilla/terrorist groups are well documented and take the form of training, arms, safehaven, and advice. Cuban support for groups that it knows engage in terrorist operations is clear.²³

21. In 1979 the Soviets themselves became active advocates of armed revolution as a means for leftist forces to gain power in Latin America. They were impressed by the victory in Nicaragua of the Cuban-supported Sandinistas, whom they themselves had previously done little to assist, and they began to believe that similar tactics might work elsewhere. They therefore began to shift from their position that the most profitable revolutionary course lay with the traditional Communist parties operating independently, and to assert that the best course was cooperation with political/military fronts such as the Sandinistas. This led the Soviets privately to urge various Communist parties (including those of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic) to establish military apparatus, to prepare for armed struggle, and to join with other leftist forces that were already engaged in guerrilla warfare and terrorism.

22. Thus, Moscow's attention has been focused on Central America, where it believes the greatest opportunities for successful revolution lie.

24. In urging the Communist parties to join the unified groups in both El Salvador and Guatemala, the Soviets undoubtedly are aware that these groups use terrorism as a basic tool for fund raising, political intimidation, and direct elimination of the opposition. The most significant member groups of the DRU have long employed such tactics as kidnappings, assassinations, and holding diplomatic installations and personnel hostage.

²³ Beginning in 1979, there was mounting evidence of Cuban support to such guerrilla/terrorist groups as the Chilean MIR, the Argentine Montoneros, and the Colombian M-19.

²⁴ However, the clearest cases are Cuban support to guerrilla/terrorist groups in El Salvador and Guatemala.

III. WESTERN EUROPE

26. Revolutionary violence in Western Europe has largely assumed the form of separatist-irredentist and nihilistic terrorism. As in other areas of the world, the Soviets and their allies have been prepared to make use of separatist dissatisfaction in countries of importance to them in order to provide them greater leverage against those governments. Thus, certain of the Palestinians have contacts with the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), an anti-Turkish and anti-American group. Bulgaria has apparently smuggled arms into Turkey on a large scale.

27. There have been widespread suspicions that the USSR and other members of the East Bloc have aided nihilistic terrorists in Western Europe, such as the Red Brigades in Italy. And it is possible that some Western European nihilists have at times received indirect Soviet support in the form of transit and safehaven in Eastern Europe. However, there is little if any indication of direct Soviet or East European support for nihilistic terrorists.

Italy (Red Brigades)

A Czechoslovak Skorpion (submachinegun) was used in Moro's murder, but it is not known how the weapon was acquired. Certain Palestinians appear to have provided the Red Brigades with a variety of weapons, including explosives, handgrenades, and heavy machineguns.

30. BR members have been among the terrorists trained in South Yemen, but allegations that they received terrorist training at camps in Czechoslovakia have not been substantiated.

Turkey

32. In May 1980 a Soviet assistant army attache in possession of a large number of Dev Yol posters was arrested by Turkish authorities.

the Turkish Foreign Minister recently informed the US Secretary of State that Turkey cannot confirm a direct Soviet role in fomenting Turkish terrorism.

33. There is large-scale smuggling of arms from Bulgaria into Turkey, where the weapons reach various extremist and terrorist groups. Bulgaria's government-run arms company, KINTEX, purchases Western-made weapons and delivers them into Turkey.

Armenian Groups

34. The Soviets historically have tried to stay close to emigre groups that represent their own national minorities. They have had contacts with and have assisted a number of Armenian parties and groups in Lebanon, as well as in Europe.

35. ASALA currently is the most active of all international terrorist groups. ASALA has attacked Turkish diplomats and installations abroad and, since late 1979, has also embarked on a campaign against various US and West European targets. ASALA's operations are all highly professional, and few ASALA terrorists have been captured.

36. In the past year, there have been reports that Fatah, the PFLP, and other Palestinian groups support ASALA.

West Germany (Baader-Meinhof)

37. The Baader-Meinhof/Red Army group represents a kind of terrorist adventuring that the Soviets have criticized severely, both publicly and privately. The gang has had extensive contacts with other West European terrorist groups and with Middle Eastern groups. Some Red Army members were trained in South Yemen in the mid-1970s, and it is possible that they had contact with Soviet advisers there. Also, some members may have used East Germany and Bulgaria as escape routes.

United Kingdom

38. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) received brief Soviet propaganda support in 1971, and the Czechoslovaks may have provided it with arms in the same year. But two years later the group was described by the KGB as a "criminal terrorist" organization, and there are currently no direct Soviet contacts with it.

Spain

39. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization occasionally carries out international terrorist attacks, although it prefers to target Spanish security and government officials. Knowledgeable officials

have claimed that ETA extremists may maintain indirect—but not direct—contacts with the Soviets. Algeria, South Yemen, and several Palestinian groups have trained ETA members.

The Curiel Apparatus

40. Henri Curiel, assassinated in Paris in 1978, formed his European-based clandestine Apparatus which has provided support to a wide variety of Third World leftist revolutionary organizations. This support has included false documents, financial aid, and safehaven before and after operations, as well as some illegal training in France in weapons and explosives. The Apparatus grew out of Curiel's involvement in supporting the FLN (National Liberation Front) during the war in Algeria. The Apparatus has seldom, if ever, functioned as a principal in terrorist operations; its association with non-Communist and nonviolent leaders, including clergymen, has tended to cloak the nature and extent of its operations. The Apparatus has been less active since the death of Curiel, but it continues to function.

41.

Curiel was a founder of the Egyptian and Sudanese Communist parties in the 1940s. Until his expulsion from Egypt in 1950, he operated a bookstore which was the only outlet for Soviet literature and propaganda in that country. He also was a first cousin of George Blake, the British intelligence officer who worked for the KGB; sentenced for espionage, Blake escaped in 1966 and now lives in Moscow.

42. During his years in Paris, Curiel was in contact with the World Peace Council, the largest and most active of the Soviet front organizations. Curiel's former deputy, Joyce Blau, one of the leaders of the Apparatus, stated that she attended a training course in the USSR in 1966. One source with contacts to the Apparatus claimed in 1964 that he had been told by an Apparatus member that the organization received extensive funding from Moscow in support of revolutionary movements, and Ernest Mandel, head of the Trotskyite Fourth International, stated in 1976 that Curiel worked for the Soviets.

43. There is substantial controversy about whether this information constitutes evidence of a Soviet link to the Apparatus. There could be several reasons for the Soviets to maintain links to the Apparatus or to try to penetrate it. It provides a mechanism for supporting potentially significant Third World revolutionary groups without the need for direct commitment or possible embarrassment. The Apparatus is accepted by

the entire spectrum of the extraparlimentary left, and it is able to monitor the politics and activities of various leftist movements—to assess their effectiveness and potential.

Carlos

44. Few international terrorists have been the subject of as much attention and speculation as Ilich Ramirez Sanchez (Carlos), educated at Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University in 1969-70. His exploits, including his participation in the kidnaping of the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna in 1976, have made him notorious. Security services are so sensitive to his reputation that simultaneous sightings of him in foreign capitals have been reported frequently.

45. Carlos first surfaced publicly following his murder of two French officers and an Arab informer in Paris in 1975. A French investigation of that incident resulted in the expulsion of several Cuban intelligence officers from France, suggesting that he may have had some contacts with them. There has been no subsequent indication of any Cuban connection.

46. After the Paris killings, Carlos sought sponsorship by radical Arab states. He cooperated with Palestinian terrorist leader Haddad as well as with the Iraqis and Libyans.

47. While Carlos's connections with European and Middle Eastern terrorists are uncontested, his relationship with Soviet and East European services is

IV. AFRICA

48. Africa is currently the site of a number of major insurgency movements that resort to terrorism, including those being waged in South Africa, Namibia, and Angola. It is also the scene of separatist violence in Ethiopia.

49. The Soviets have long been enthusiastic supporters of revolutionary violence in Africa, and have provided considerable equipment to insurgents who have engaged in terrorism. On occasion, the Soviets have privately criticized the efficacy of such terrorist tactics, and they have tried to foster more conventional paramilitary operations. Despite these criticisms, the Soviets have not withdrawn their support from these groups.

Zimbabwe

50. During the late 1970s, the Soviets, East Europeans, and Cubans greatly increased their direct assistance to Joshua Nkomo's outlawed ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union). Soviet assistance included training and advice as well as large quantities of arms, usually delivered through Angola and Zambia. ZAPU, while engaging primarily in guerrilla activities, also committed a number of terrorist attacks within Rhodesia, including the shooting down of two Viscount passenger planes with SA-7 missiles.

51. Beginning in 1977, the Soviets sought to increase their influence in the Rhodesian situation by transforming ZAPU into a conventional military force. This decision was followed by deliveries of large quantities of conventional heavy equipment to ZAPU and by training in its use. The Soviets tried without success to persuade ZAPU to target specific military and economic objectives within the country, and were scathing in their criticism of the organization's continuing propensity to attack "soft" targets as being politically counterproductive and militarily ineffective.

South Africa

52. *African National Congress (ANC)*. The Soviets have long supported the ANC, a mostly black political/military movement dedicated to the overthrow of the South African Government. The ANC has emerged as the most effective force among those fighting against the South African regime, and it is supported by most members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), some West European countries, and a number of public and private organizations.

53. In the face of South Africa's overwhelming military superiority, the ANC has been able to mount only infrequent hit-and-run raids, using a handful of men in cross-border operations. The ANC has claimed credit for about half the paramilitary and terrorist op-

erations inside South Africa since 1975. It has set off a series of bombs at several facilities belonging to the South African Coal, Oil, and Gas Corporation, and it took a number of hostages during an abortive attempt to rob a Pretoria bank in January 1980.

54. The ANC leadership has close ties with the outlawed, pro-Soviet South African Communist Party (SACP). The Soviets are the major external source of military assistance to the ANC, which also receives funds from the Liberation Committee of the OAU. Students from the group have gone to the USSR, and ANC recruits have received military training in the USSR, East Germany, Cuba, Angola, and possibly Libya.

55. There have been numerous meetings between Oliver Tambo, the current ANC leader, and Soviet officials; in 1977, Tambo met with then Soviet President Podgorny and reportedly obtained promises of increased military training and weaponry. Tambo has claimed that his organization and the Soviets are agreed on future strategy inside South Africa—that they must begin to engage in "urban guerrilla warfare." ANC terrorists captured in South Africa reportedly told South African security police that they had been trained in "urban guerrilla warfare" in the USSR and that the future targets were to be schools, churches, and public establishments associated with the Afrikaner population.

56. *South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)*. Since 1975, the Soviet Union has been the principal military supporter of SWAPO. The Soviets, with Angola's active cooperation, have provided SWAPO with almost all of its military equipment. SWAPO troops based in Angola have used this equipment in their guerrilla raids into northern Namibia, where operations are aimed at undermining the government's authority and its ability to maintain security. SWAPO terrorist operations have included the kidnapping as well as the killing of Namibians who cooperate with territorial authorities.

57. Cuba and East Germany also provide valuable support for SWAPO. Assisted by Angolan authorities, the Cubans—and to a lesser extent the East Germans—distribute Soviet military equipment to guerrilla facilities and forces in Angola. Cuban advisers provide substantial training to SWAPO cadres and help in developing guerrilla tactics, and may assist in planning cross-border operations into northern Namibia.

V. EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

58. The Soviets were major supporters of revolutionary violence during the Vietnam war. Despite the end of that war, revolutionary violence has continued to plague Asia, largely in the form of insurgency and separatist movements. Asia has also spawned a number of nihilists like the members of the Japanese Red Army. The principal focus of Soviet military assistance in this region has been Indochina, where the USSR supports Vietnam's efforts to suppress opposition to the regime installed by Vietnam in Cambodia.

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

59. The JRA is a nihilistic group which is responsible for some of the most vicious terrorist incidents on record. Although originally formed in Japan, the JRA became associated with the PFLP in the early 1970s. Most of its members are now based in the Middle East. PFLP and JRA members have carried out combined operations in the past, and periodically there are reports that the JRA is again preparing for joint or unilateral actions. The group has not carried out an operation since 1977, but it retains connections with support groups in Japan. Group leaders have recently indicated interest in renewing activities in Japan.

60. In the early 1970s the KGB labeled the JRA "a criminal terrorist organization."

The Philippines and Thailand

61. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is a Muslim organization seeking independence for part of the southern Philippines. While Libya has given small arms to the group in the past, the level of this assistance has declined over the past four years. Libya has also trained members of the other Muslim insurgency in the Pacific area, the Pattani United Liberation Organization based in southern Thailand.

Pakistan

N [REDACTED]

the plane was on the ground in Kabul, the Soviets tried to exploit the incident to force Pakistan to deal with the Soviet-dominated Kabul regime. There is evidence that the Afghan regime aided the hijackers by allowing them to rearm. It is not clear whether it provided the hijackers with weapons or permitted them access to weapons already in the plane's hold. It is unlikely that the Kabul regime could have aided the hijackers without Soviet knowledge and approval. The Soviets helped arrange the plane's departure to Syria, and subsequently some of the hijackers returned to Kabul.

63. The Soviets apparently approve of general PLA activities, although they probably did not have advance knowledge of the 2 March hijacking. Once

ANNEX B

TRAINING CAMPS IN THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE

I. THE USSR

1. A substantial body of evidence from both human and technical sources indicates that the Soviet Union has been training a diverse array of Third World revolutionaries—largely from Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East—at facilities in the USSR since at least the mid-1960s.

2. The Soviet General Staff, through its Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and its 10th Directorate (for foreign military assistance), is the executive body responsible for most of the military and paramilitary training. The International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has a coordinating and, in many cases, an organizing and management role in this activity. The KGB also conducts some paramilitary training, but on a relatively limited scale.

3. The type of instruction given to Third World nationals varies, depending apparently on the circumstances and needs of the particular group being trained.

I. EASTERN EUROPE

6. Available intelligence reporting on training centers in Eastern Europe has been limited and of questionable reliability. Likewise, open press sources are not readily verifiable and frequently have been based on secondhand information or rumor. No reliable report indicates terrorist training as such in Eastern Europe.²²

²² Following is an alternative view of the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps; and the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force. They believe that this statement underestimates both the range and quality of our reporting on terrorist training camps in Eastern Europe.

Their reliability varies, but taken together they lead these agencies to believe that the East Europeans have long been involved in training members of West European terrorist groups.

7. We do not discount the possibility that Third World nationals are being trained at East European sites in paramilitary techniques. Our reporting on this score, however, is frequently circumstantial and attributable to secondary sources at best. In strong contrast to reporting on military and paramilitary training sites in the USSR, it lacks convincing detail. [REDACTED] are examples of the sorts of reports that are currently available:

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